

U.S. Coast Guard Oral History Program

Attack on America: September 11, 2001 and the U.S. Coast Guard

U.S. COAST GUARD ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM Operation Noble Eagle Documentation Project

Interviewee: Rear Admiral Patrick Stillman, USCG

Program Executive Officer for the Deepwater Project

Interviewer: PAC Peter Capelotti, USCGR Date of Interview: 4 March 2002

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Q: Admiral Sir, can you recall where you were on the morning of 9/11? Were you here in the building?

RADM Stillman: Yeah, very much so. In fact I was meeting with the Commandant [Admiral James Loy] and a gentleman by the name of Vance Coffman who's the CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation. We were in the Commandant's office having a meeting and this was - if I'm not mistaken - between eight and nine o'clock.

Immediately after that meeting I walked downstairs with Mr. Coffman to see him off and discuss a few other issues germane to the Coast Guard - and what Lockheed Martin is obviously concerned about as far as not only the Deepwater proposal but other proposals as well - and as we walked through the lobby the CNN monitor indicated that one of the Trade Towers was on fire and we both looked up at that and we were just astounded I guess is the right way to put it. At that point in time it wasn't clear to us as to what the genesis of the fire was. In many respects I had no indication when I first saw that that in fact an aircraft had flown into the building.

But immediately Mr. Coffman jumped in his automobile and I ran upstairs, back up to the Commandant's office just to give them a heads up that something was definitely coming down as far as the Trade Center was concerned. By the time I got back upstairs they had turned on the TVs and were obviously concerned.

I then left and went down to a meeting in the Chief of Staff's office area. There was an SMT, which is a Senior Management Team meeting scheduled and during the course of that period it was announced that indeed there had been a second incident that was confirmed in terms of the nature of the incident as far as an aircraft flying into the second tower. When that was announced it was rather all-daunting in terms of the tone, but then became prevalent as far as the meeting. Shortly after that it was secured and I came up here.

Q: How soon between the time that that meeting was secured and you returned to your . . . I assume that you were called together with the other flag officers to meet with the Commandant that morning? Did he gather his people together?

RADM Stillman: Well no, not necessarily. I don't recall that specifically, that the Commandant immediately became involved in the Emergency Management issues. I think he was called up to meet with the Secretary. I don't specifically recall his particular schedule.

But for us, immediately our focus tended to gravitate: A; the safety and security of people in the building. It wasn't too long thereafter where it was evident that there had been an incident at the Pentagon. We did not have any confirmation immediately that it was a third aircraft, but it was evident that there was a serious problem over there because the smoke and just the visible situation was terribly troubling.

Q: When did you have a sense that the country was under attack, or did you that morning?

RADM Stillman: Well I'm not sure that immediately I knew. I would say probably by eleven o'clock that morning. It was principally through CNN and the news that it became evident that indeed the country was under attack and that when it was announced that there was still a fourth aircraft that was missing, obviously that heightened the individuals concerns.

Q: Was there a moment when the senior leadership got together to talk about the Coast Guard's response?

RADM Stillman: Well I think on that day, no, I don't believe so, other than the Chief of Staff [Vice Admiral Timothy W. Josiah] obviously being very attentive to the Headquarters' environment and attending to the needs of folks here. Obviously it was somewhat challenging in that all government employees except essential personnel were sent home. As I recall that was probably about one or two in the afternoon. I don't recall the specific time. But it was a very troubling environment as far as the workplace and the people were very concerned about their children. They didn't know if they were securing the schools.

Q: Did you say anything to your staff that day? I mean did people call together . . .?

RADM Stillman: I purposefully walked through all the spaces to talk to people.

Q: What kind of things did you say to them?

RADM Stillman: Well generally speaking, just to let them know that it was a very troubling scenario and that we were all in this together. That if they had any personal needs or concerns, that they needed to let us know immediately and that somehow we would attend to them.

Q: That's a good point because one of the things that I'm interested in exploring with senior leadership is exactly that point, is I would assume that you have a self awareness that you're an admiral - and I'll be asking this of all the senior officers - so that when you walk around, to say, talk to a petty officer or a civilian and so forth, that they aren't themselves around you because of

who you are and you could be the greatest guy in the world but you're still an admiral. What do you do? Do you think about it and what do you do to assure yourself that you're getting real information or that people aren't just saying, oh, everything's fine Admiral, don't worry, and all the rest. Is there a point where you say, you know, just cut the bull, let me know what's really going on, or how do you handle those situations?

RADM Stillman: Well I think the answer to the question is tied to habitual practice with systematic regularity such that when emergent incidents occur that truly require a sense of honest and open communication, that that rapport is established.

Q: So you feel like you have that with your people now?

RADM Stillman: Well I certainly like to hope I do. We have gravitated to three key constructs in terms of the Deepwater enterprise and one is people, in that we have basically committed ourselves to developing and nurturing a learning organization and within that construct there is the need to ensure that people consciously attend to their needs and that they recognize that we are committed to serving those needs. So it was evident to me as I walked around and talked to people that there was a very deep concern in terms of what was transpiring. It was evident in their faces. It was evident in their eyes and certainly it was very evident in terms of the conversation. I guess if I had to categorize the scenario in one or two words, I mean there was shock and disbelief. I mean it was very difficult to try to square what was transpiring: A; because there was a lack of information. We really didn't know other than the updates that we were getting from the radio or CNN.

Q: When you identify something or something raises a flag with you, how do you follow up so that in your own mind something's being done about it? Do you have a person at different levels of your staff that you look to to solve problems at those levels. In other words, if you see something bubbling up, how do you make sure that it's taken care of?

RADM Stillman: Well indeed, I mean the hierarchical nature of the organization here in Headquarters is certainly germane to the Deepwater enterprise as well. We have cadres of people with individual managers who are responsible for those folks, so if there was a specific concern or an issue that needed attention over the course of the follow-on period, that individual certainly took an interest, but I tend to try to do likewise. I mean I attempt to practice Peter's and Blanchard's dictum of managing by wandering around and being visible so that people know that you're interested. I think your point's well taken that not withstanding the fact that you are a flag officer, through, I think, a conscious attempt to let people know that you are concerned about them and that you have an interest in them, and you can better deal with situations.

Q: Well I think the other side of that coin is what the military historian Paul Fussell talks about, about what an officer is suppose to be. He says that the trick for an officer is to see what you would be and the formula for dealing with fear is ultimately rhetorical and theatrical. You have to adopt a carriage that will affect your audience's fears in the hope that you will be imitated. Is that something you're sympathetic with, that you have to be the officer that people expect to see out of you?

RADM Stillman: Well I don't speak the Greek assessment that all life is a play. I would embrace that to a certain extent. I do think that the Coast Guard, because it's so small, tends to mute to a certain extent the normal organizational mores, if you will, tied to extremely well-defined hierarchical organizations. I think that we, because of our size, have over time flattened the organization to a certain extent in both its culture as well as its structure, and because of that I think the concept of leadership has been very much alone, if you will, to serving the needs of people, in that because I think we're somewhat humanitarian and pre-disposed in our intuitions that you find a culture that truly is based upon the need to develop our out of "calling" community.

Q: Which is sort of the opposite of a strict hierarchy.

RADM Stillman: Right. Most hierarchical organizations can be very sterile and that tends to inhibit communication. I do think that the Coast Guard has overcome that to a certain extent because of the morays of the organization and the fact that we aren't very tight-knit and close, and that's not at all uncommon for the captain and the seaman to be interacting on a daily basis and that over time there's a comfort level that tends to transpire.

Q: And does that translate into a more effective organization do you think?

RADM Stillman: Well from my perspective it does. I've pondered with great length how culture and structure form organizational competencies and effectiveness, and by that I mean, I think from an epistemological standpoint there's an objective and subjective side to the organization and for the Coast Guard we've been, I think, a great benefit of our subjective nature in that Maritime Security and Maritime Safety have always been fundamentally part of the morays of the organization in that it has attracted individuals accordingly.

Q: One of the vignettes I've been told is that when the Commandant did call the senior leadership around, when I guess they were looking to him for something, at one point he said something on the order of, gentlemen, the Coast Guard today is different than it was yesterday. There must have been some point in either that day or in the next few days when you realized that this new world was going to impact this massive project that you're the head of. Have you thought about that in the weeks and months since then?

RADM Stillman: Well I mean absolutely. The nature of the business mandates that you think about that with alacrity and detail because of the present state of this program in that you have a request for proposals that has been issued in late June and their responses were due in late September and they arrived on time and we began a formal evaluation period on the 1st of October. With 9/11 and the impact of that event as far as the long term missions and requirements of the Coast Guard, it was important to step back and take a look at the constructs and foundations of the acquisition to ensure that the requirements that we had specified and set forth were germane, current, and not in need of significant modification. If in fact the requirements change significantly, you are obligated to issue a change to the request for proposal and afford industry the offer or opportunity to adjust their submissions accordingly.

Q: What are some of the things that were different?

RADM Stillman: Well we consciously stepped back and took a look at the landscape in a very broad content. When I say we I mean both the sponsor, which is G-O, the Operations Directorate. They have the responsibility for defining the requirements of the acquisition. We have the responsibility for implementing those within the parameters of cost schedule and performance that normally surround all large acquisition efforts.

Q: You are in G-A [Acquisition], is that right?

RADM Stillman: Well I'm in G-D [Deepwater Program Executive Office].

Q: You are a separate directorate?

RADM Stillman: A separate directorate.

Q: So you are the head of a separate directorate under the Chief of Staff?

RADM Stillman: It solely focuses on the Integrated Deepwater System.

Q: Okay.

RADM Stillman: So with 9/11 in mind, we stepped back and took a look at where we were at as far as Deepwater was concerned. The fact that this is a performance-based acquisition, and by that I mean it's not a normal acquisition where you have specific operational requirements, documents that we use to develop one for one asset replacement concepts, but the contrary. This was a systems approach that took the entire spectrum of Coast Guard operating assets, recognized that they were antiquated to a certain extent and aging, and in need of replacement by the end of this decade. Knowing that since really the days of [Alexander] Hamilton when the first revenue cutter took station, that in all respects mostly what we do is surveil areas of either the coastal or offshore environment, detect contacts, identify those contacts, classify them and then make a decision as to how we would prosecute them; via put a boarding party onboard or query them and then permit them to proceed to their destination or a safe passage, whatever the case may be. But because you have that common strain of task sequence tied to multiple missions, industry basically was for the opportunity to increase our operational effectives as it pertained to being able to surveil and prosecute contacts.

Q: So you saw that as the primary . . . because this is obviously on everybody's mind after 9/11, that when's the next shoe going to drop. It was an airplane this time. It's going to be a ship next time; container, whatever it is.

RADM Stillman: Right, so you step back and you look at the challenge at hand - tied to 9/11 - and then look at the construct that was used to define the effectiveness of the Deepwater System. We consciously arrived at the decision that there was no significant need to change the requirements. That, quite the contrary, because it was performance based and because it was very high level in terms of the detail tied to the systems performance specification, in that industry had an immense amount of trade space as to how they could use opportunities to increase the effectiveness of the Coast Guard from a systems standpoint. That really the terrorist incident that took place on 9/11, honestly had been generally part of the Deepwater equation from the start. By that I mean the Interagency Task Force on Multiple Missions for the Coast Guard that was conducted in '99, hit the streets in February of 2000. I spoke to the Deepwater Acquisition and spoke to the future missions of the Coast Guard, encompassed the issue of A-symmetric threats and the fact that terrorism was a concern that we needed to be attentive to in the next decade as it pertained to the 21st century Coast Guard, and that honesty has been whickered in, for lack of a better metaphor, from the start. Deepwater really was in, I think, solid and safe water in terms of the requirements that were on the streets and didn't mandate any significant change.

Q: There's been a lot of discussion of getting current intelligence down to the ship; the people who are doing the interdicting. You talked about Deepwater, moving across the entire spectrum of Coast Guard assets. Is there a point, or do envision a point where those kind of C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] and so forth . . . at what point does that come down to? Does it come down to, let's say the captains of the ports and the small boat stations, so that a small boat doing a routine port security patrol has that kind of intelligence that say somebody has on a cutter? Is that where you see this going ultimately?

RADM Stillman: Well it's a good question and I think the answer's found in . . . the hardest systems performance I think for the 21st century Coast Guard is the ability to truly use C4ISR to one's benefit, and to respond - be it at any number of different levels - to the information and communication that you have at hand, knowing full well that in our business that volume of information continues to grow and grow and grow. So you need the ability to synthesize that information and project it into what I call a common operating picture, such that mobile operational assets can use it to their benefit. The Integrated Deepwater System is predicated on

the need for C4ISR improvements. Not only at the asset level, but at the systems level, such that perhaps you may see fusion centers for information. Now would that in turn permit better direction of supporting assets? Would that encompass the Captain of the port group's coastal inventory and asset mix as well as this Deepwater asset? I think the answer is absolutely yes. I envision the National Distress Response System Modernization Plan as being very much a compliment to Deepwater. That we have a responsibility to ensure that those systems are interoperable and that they are interlocked as much as we possibly can and that that would become pervasive, if you will, within the construct of attending to homeland security. I have a dilemma in that Deepwater presents a brand management problem, and by that I mean when this was initially started it was discussed within the construct of incidents that occur more than 50 miles offshore, and honestly I think that's a misnomer and it does not serve . . .

Q: Did that construct come from the Coast Guard's initial belief in what this was?

RADM Stillman: Yeah. I mean this was two or three years ago. When they were initially talking about the Deepwater enterprise it was ship centered, focused on ships, aircraft, C4ISR. But at that point in time you had the fisheries challenge, the counter-drug challenge, AMIO (Alien Migrant Interdiction Operation), the whole challenges are tied to missions, to call for the need for Coast Guard presence in the exclusive economic zone and even further offshore such that the messaging and the communications as far as substantiating (Inaudible - Tape Interrupted) with the Deepwater system was tied to more than 50 miles offshore, when in reality if you look at the assets that are being replaced, many of them are directly related to your coastal response capability. All your rotary wing assets would be replaced under Deepwater, or modernized. All your fixed wing assets would be modernized and eventually replaced. The patrol boats - 110-foot cutters - not the 87s, but the 110s would fall under the aegis of Deepwater. In addition, if you think about *Exxon Valdez* or the North Slope incident off Rhode Island, North Cape, if you think about TWA [Flight] 800; all those incidents manifested the need for very capable command and control platforms that were filled through by the 270s, 378s or larger ships that truly have the C2 (Command-and-Control) capability to direct a large number of units.

Q: One of the things that happened that morning - and I don't know if this feeds directly to what you're describing - but a lieutenant from Activities New York looked around at this chaos and decided how we were going to manage these boats in the harbor going all over the place and they were offered the Sandy Hook Pilot's Association - I guess its 270 feet or something - and use that as the command and control, the VTS [Vessel Traffic Service] for North Cove, and I said, well why did you use that instead of a Coast Guard cutter. The [USCGC] Tahoma [WMEC-908] arrived a few hours later and so forth and so on and he said, well we ran the [Coast Guard] ensign up on the New York - the name of this vessel - it had better comms [communications], but, he said, for me, I made the decision very quickly because a Pilot Association pilot has a 14-year apprenticeship in that harbor. If somebody says I need to get these casualties to this place or that place, well I wasn't sure that the boats that we had coming in were going to know where all these places were, so I need to have people there that knew the area. But the comms thing certainly was interesting to me, that he said we were managing 70 vessels at once and we could do it better from there than we could - he said, meaning no disrespect to the assets on scene, but he said, I thought we could do it better from that vessel. Is that the kind of thing that this could help?

RADM Stillman: Oh absolutely. I mean when you step back and look at how you're going to really improve the operational effectiveness of the Coast Guard - coupled with the recognition that as your global commons expand in terms of the venues of commerce in the maritime arena, there is a significant need for the ability to synthesize large amounts of information and compliment it with adroit communication concepts that enhance your effectiveness - that's fundamental to the equation.

Q: You have a set of extremely sophisticated platforms that you're working on. Do you foresee - and here I'm thinking about vessels like the [USCGC] *Healy* [WAGB-20] that have sort of boiled down their crew and you have this very highly trained crew that stays there longer and is - do you envision that model Coast Guard wide where you have fewer people but they're more highly trained to deal with this new highly technological, highly information-driven environment?

RADM Stillman: There's no question, none. I mean if you truly want to improve your operational effectiveness while at the same time controlling and attempting to reduce your total ownership costs, you begin to gravitate specifically to the cost of people because that's two thirds of your operating base. Can you leverage modern technology to reengineer the way you process in the operational environment in order to be more effective and efficient? I think the answer is absolute.

Q: How does the Coast Guard go about reengineering the brains of its sailors and officers?

RADM Stillman: Carefully. (Laughter) That's a great question and I will readily admit to you that I think one of the biggest challenges that the organization has is to address its cultural morays within the construct of efficiency and effectiveness pertaining to a Deepwater solution. But the reality is that I think thriving organizations today, in both the public and private sector, are very adept at reengineering because change is fundamental to the workplace. If you can't adapt expediently to that change you will suffocate and suffer the consequences. For us, the mandate of public service in the effective delivery of those services, I think, forces you to reengineer consciously, constructively and continually, and to be honest, we need to do a better job.

Q: One of the things that I see in the Deepwater philosophy is investing in professional development of your personnel. I guess you foresee a point - or do you foresee a point - where sailors, officers and so forth, in a small service that's stressed with all of these different missions - and here I'm thinking of Sir, of the Marine Corps model - where we come to a point that professional development combined with *esprit de corps* serve as the cores of the organization as opposed to this sort of, we're going to throw you into this and you've got to do the best you can type of operating mode that seems to characterize so much of the Coast Guard's history?

RADM Stillman: Well I think your point's very well taken. I guess if you look at what Deepwater in the Coast Guard will be 30/40 years down the road, my personal statement - not anything else - I think it's, not withstanding the fact that we're going to grow by a certain number of people, I think the Coast Guard's going to be smaller. I think it should be, and by that I mean I think that unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], unmanned surface vehicles . . . modern technology permits us great opportunity. I think that we would be remiss if we did not look to opportunities tied to logistical support outside the organization on a contractual basis. I don't embrace the dictum that to do it right you have to do it yourself. I think that is, quite frankly, passé, and we need to avidly seek ways to embrace opportunities in public/private partnerships that serve our people - workload management as well as the taxpayer's pocketbook - and nevertheless still carry the mantle of being the guardians of America's maritime security and safety.

Q: Well that's a fascinating point, having unmanned surface vessels as they do surface surveillance in different areas that would be the same way that we have these Predators in Afghanistan now surveilling and naturally launching attacks? Do you see a similar type of vehicle that the Coast Guard would use where somebody would sit in an office - anywhere for all intensive purposes - and monitor their area remotely?

RADM Stillman: I don't think there's any question.

Q: Is that something that Deepwater has explored in terms of these?

RADM Stillman: Yes, particularly in the aviation arena as far as UAVs because they have become more mature, if you will, over time and obviously Kosovo and Afghanistan certainly has, I'd say, abbreviated the spiral development timeline necessary for their use and implementation.

Q: Nothing like a war.

RADM Stillman: No, no question. I think eventually that will also apply to unmanned surface vehicles. We're not drilling too hard in the sub-surface arena, but from the force protection standpoint, as far as providing force protection for units in foreign ports and even domestically, could be that eventually you'd see monitors that would guard against that potential of a full incident somewhere.

Q: I'd like to ask you about one other - you have here, be relentless in your optimism. A small overstressed organization sort of breeds negativity. How do you drain that away from your command?

RADM Stillman: Well look. To me you've got one of two ways to tack the ship. I mean you can absolutely reconcile the fact that it's not easy. It never has been and quite frankly never will be under the guys for me and I think for the Coast Guard the sea is a relentless teacher but also an adversary. It's a real paradox. But the resolution of paradox is fundamental to leadership. We've been gifted with the sea as a teacher for well over two centuries. I think it's promoted a sense of humility and artistry that permits people to be "can do" and optimistic in their deportment, rather than pessimistic and what I would call an America'cant, alright. I'm into simplification at this point in my life.

Q: I guess you have to be when you're an admiral. (Laughter)

RADM Stillman: Yeah, well I don't know. I think it's true for all Americans. It's got so much - well for everybody - I think the planet; mainly it's for necessity for simplification because computers and technology have revolutionized the way we exist.

Q: Well it's interesting. We're surrounded by complexity, both in our technology and the data that it transmits to us, and yet it hasn't really made us more sophisticated thinkers. I think it makes us more simplified thinkers because we have to try to find more new strategies to boil all this stuff down.

RADM Stillman: I have to agree with you entirely, absolutely. So because of that I think it's the Robert Frost dictum; you come to that fork in the road. You can go left. You can go right. Certainly the decade of the Nineties was challenging to the Coast Guard as far as growing missions, fewer assets and self imposed reductions tied to people. Okay, I appreciate that. By the same token we certainly have the need, the necessity, the obligation and the support of a continuum of core values that permit us to be optimists. I mean when all is said and done, if an organization truly acts upon the dictums of duty, honor and respect, I think you have reason to be optimistic.

Q: Two more things here. Throw away all rice bowls. What does that mean? I mean I remember the *Sand Pebbles* where they - you broke the guy's rice bowl and took his job away but . . .?

RADM Stillman: Well it's a management metaphor. We've changed it to "Don't be provincial in your attitudes", and by that I mean you should . . .

Q: Having grown up in Massachusetts I know what provincial means.

RADM Stillman: Yes, right. I think that, and it's the metaphor I commonly use, that people in large organizations - and I consider the Coast Guard a large organization - tend to think in watertight compartments. I mean it's just habitual and that's human nature and when you're truly afforded the opportunity to confront change in a positive way you've got to open up the hatch in that watertight compartment and truly step outside and embrace the fact that there's potential to do business better, and by the same token some people would say that, that metaphorically, is breaking rice bowls. So that's what that's about, and the beauty of this Deepwater effort is that it permits the opportunity to truly reengineer the way you do business in order to be far more effective and efficient.

Q: Finally here, laugh at yourself and with others. Military hierarchies have traditionally not been known for their ability to laugh at themselves. How do you foster that in your command?

RADM Stillman: Well I think Aristotle had it right. Humor is a cardinal virtue and I don't think that's ever changed. Truly one of the best ways to defuse the stress and the pain of a 9/11 incident or low management requirement that tends to promote this pessimism rather than optimism, I think, is the ability to laugh together. I'm into community concepts at this point and I think that [Alexis] de Tocqueville had it right that this country really was afforded the opportunity to thrive on a sense of community and that that was really our raison d'être when all was said and done, notwithstanding the fact that they were showing individualism. This is certainly a fabric of our culture and manifests itself in multiple ways, but we are, by nature, communitarian, and I think 9/11 was high evidence of that. In all respects it's a phenomenal strength and in the military when all is said and done, although we certainly profess hierarchy and rank structure - the reality is we're very much communitarian because - look, [William] Manchester had it right, I think, in Goodbye Darkness. It's a book I always remember about his experience in the Marines and when he discussed why it was that he left the hospital and went back to the front lines to join his fellow comrades. He said, hey, I didn't do it for God. I didn't do it for the country. I did it for my friends. The reality is that it's people's common aspirations that have formed the Coast Guard. and hey, you do go out and you don't have to come back and that's the beauty of the enterprise.

Q: Do you bring anything to this job from having been one of the few Americans who commanded a tall ship?

RADM Stillman: Well I hope so. I think that, once again, Aristotle used the sailing ship as a metaphor for one's metaphysical ballast, if you will, and that all of us are afforded the opportunity to sail on the proper tact in life and for me that has always been a beautiful metaphor. I mean, [USCGB] *Eagle* [WIX-327] is of a complex entity on the surface, but in reality it's a very simple enterprise.

Q: Simple in what way?

RADM Stillman: Well notwithstanding the fact that you have 23 sails, 90 percent of your drive is basically tied to six of those 23 sails and that once again it affords adept simplification and that because it mandates the need for self assessment, courage and humility. When you get up on a royal or when you're hauling on the braces, trying to bring the yards around, you can't do it absent somebody standing next to you in many respects. So it's a cradle of community in all respects in that it was very self-reinforcing for me to be in *Eagle* over a number of different experiences to help me school my leadership approach.

Q: You saw that as a training ground for your philosophy?

RADM Stillman: Yeah. I mean it was a practicum of experiential development that I think in a large part molded my heart as much as my mind.

Q: Really?

RADM Stillman: Yeah.

Q: Finally Sir, just the opposite of humility. Take me forward nine years and Commandant Stillman is rolling out the first Deepwater asset. Do you foresee that within this decade?

RADM Stillman: Well I don't think there's any question that the first Deepwater asset will be rolled out. I would expect that you will see the first ship come off the line probably in '05 or '06.

Q: Yes?

RADM Stillman: I would hope so, and that in many respects assuming that we make an award this summer, that the change will begin thereafter and that we will have a partnership with an integrator for an extended period of time that can do nothing if we stick to the knitting and attend to positive simplified practices that permit objective reality and self-assessment that will carry them out over time.

Q: Well Sir I want to thank you for your time.

RADM Stillman: Oh, it's no problem Peter, and if you have some other concerns or questions . . .

Q: I appreciate that Sir. In fact I usually wind these up by saying if it wouldn't be too much to impose on you, after June 1st I start the writing process. If I could call on you again I'd appreciate that opportunity very much.

RADM Stillman: I'd be happy too, sure.

Q: Sir, thank you. It's been great to meet you.

END OF INTERVIEW